The difference between SEAD and DEAD
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I’m not talking about the game, I’m talking about in RL combat situations, they really broke into allied flight frequencies and just turned off their radars whenever they heard a HARM call go out?
So am I. All open channels. No encryption.
They WANT the SAM sites to listen.
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So am I. All open channels. No encryption.
They WANT the SAM sites to listen.
interesting…
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there is a system called havquick which hops frequency’s but it’s not always used.
also they know based on asusmptions and experience. just like we can know if there is a missile on it’s way to us if you see the enemy aircraft cranking you
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So am I. All open channels. No encryption.
They WANT the SAM sites to listen.
Interesting indeed
I would like to hear an explantion for this……
In RL communications are heavilly encrypted (like mentioned before), Have quick, Secure voice or even a combination of both.
Both systems are “not implemented” in BMS but if you think of it, you can try every frequency but wil never hear enemy communications. Save to say they won’t hear us either;).
So maybe not technical implemented, it seems to be working -
A good reminder is that what is called in BMS 4.33 “SEAD” was called in BMS 4.32 “SEAD Escort” and what is called “DEAD” was called “SEAD.” So it’s no surprise that every SEAD flight in BMS 4.33 is tasked relative to some other friendly flight. The mission isn’t to go kill the 1234th Air Defense Battalion but to make sure that Bone 1 flight doesn’t die due to air defenses. Typically (e.g. by computer created ATO) SEAD is a task for a flight within a package where the escorted element is another flight in the package. The job is to do whatever it takes for the other airplane to do its mission.
DEAD is “kill 1234th Air Defense Battalion.” There’s no flight specified to escort. Everyone else can go get shot down if they want. Your job is to kill that specific ground unit.
A lot of seemingly duplicate mission types in BMS have this distinction between the geographic, airborne, ground, etc. reference for what is otherwise the same basic concept.
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Regarding encryption or other techniques. I never understood when various comsec practices are or aren’t used and why. HQII isn’t encryption in the traditional sense. It’s a coded scheme for frequency agility but otherwise the message is plain. The KY-58 or -100 or whatever is genuine encryption in the sense that even if you followed the HQII hops and got the whole message it’s still coded. One can use one technique or the other or both or neither.
I get the impression that every layer of comsec is a bit of a pain, reduces readability, and increases the chance of excluding a legit user. Perhaps it’s discouraged from using techniques constantly that it just helps however is trying to compromise the system. Plain language code wording is possibly enough for most situations.
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Interesting indeed
I would like to hear an explantion for this……
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM-88_HARM
Read under “deployment”.
Also read “Viper Pilot: A Memoir of Air Combat” by Dan Hampton. He goes into that a lot as well, including real world operations, and how they use radio during SEAD/DEAD.
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Read Viper Pilot…best damn book I ever read from a Target Arm Weasel.
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Dan Hampton has a book coming out in a few weeks detailing the history of the wild weasel also
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM-88_HARM
Read under “deployment”.
Also read “Viper Pilot: A Memoir of Air Combat” by Dan Hampton. He goes into that a lot as well, including real world operations, and how they use radio during SEAD/DEAD.
It also wouldnt be the first thing from that book that was accentuated for reader benefit or misremembered. So there’s that.
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from the BMS manual, pg 210:
• DEAD: Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses. As the title implies you must destroy as many
specific radars and/or launchers as possible at the target steerpoints. That’s the old SEAD STRIKE
tasking from 4.32.• SEAD: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses. This time you don’t have to destroy specific ADA, but
usually protect a strike package from enemy air defenses. It’s the old SEAD ESCORT tasking. Mission
success is tied to the strike package sustaining no losses. -
It also wouldnt be the first thing from that book that was accentuated for reader benefit or misremembered. So there’s that.
That’s for sure.
there is a system called havquick which hops frequency’s but it’s not always used.
also they know based on asusmptions and experience. just like we can know if there is a missile on it’s way to us if you see the enemy aircraft cranking you
Yep. We can imagine everything here. Deception can be used in both ways.
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It also wouldnt be the first thing from that book that was accentuated for reader benefit or misremembered. So there’s that.
Quite so, but SAM operators shutting down radars when they hear “Magnum” from pilots keeps repeating in that book, and elsewhere.
Also, OPSEC has never been very high during military flight engagements. Ease of communication has always been more important than blocking eavesdropping, especially on UHF. Whoever is listening in don’t know the current BULLSEYE and has no idea what the various code names used mean anyway, so the risk of locking out pilots from communication through incorrect keys is not worth the possibility of some tiny added amount of security.
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Also, OPSEC has never been very high during military flight engagements. Ease of communication has always been more important than blocking eavesdropping, especially on UHF. Whoever is listening in don’t know the current BULLSEYE and has no idea what the various code names used mean anyway, so the risk of locking out pilots from communication through incorrect keys is not worth the possibility of some tiny added amount of security.
True till some time ago, nowadays multiple military aircraft systems (think GPS, LINK-16, IFF M5, SATCOM for example) need crypto keys just to be functional. So using encrypted radios are just a small part and one of the simplest of the encrypted communications. In case any problems occur, switching to plain radio communication is always still a possibility but most of the time not preferred.
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True till some time ago, nowadays multiple military aircraft systems (think GPS, LINK-16, IFF M5, SATCOM for example) need crypto keys just to be functional. So using encrypted radios are just a small part and one of the simplest of the encrypted communications. In case any problems occur, switching to plain radio communication is always still a possibility but most of the time not preferred.
That has been the case for a long time. For most of those systems you list for as long as they have existed.
However, notably absent from your list is the UHF direct voice com radios, for a reason. Those are usually not encrypted.
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FYI, in yougoslvia, the hit rate of HARMS vs SA-6 batteries was abysmal yet no SA-6 managed any kill on coalition aircrafts. That’s exactly what suppression does against skilled operators : they managed to evade destruction with good tactics but were never able to shoot down anybody.
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Quite so, but SAM operators shutting down radars when they hear “Magnum” from pilots keeps repeating in that book, and elsewhere.
Also, OPSEC has never been very high during military flight engagements. Ease of communication has always been more important than blocking eavesdropping, especially on UHF. Whoever is listening in don’t know the current BULLSEYE and has no idea what the various code names used mean anyway, so the risk of locking out pilots from communication through incorrect keys is not worth the possibility of some tiny added amount of security.
During training on the other hand, setting HQ is a matter of course and part of many unit SOPS. Its one major part of why there exist jobs in the military to coordinate communications… someone has to produce that OPSTASKLINK etc for you
You might like to know that the concept of ‘current bullseye’ is one specific to BMS. It is atypical to have a single bullseye that covers an entire theater, as BMS does. Have a listen to some red flag comms, you will hear them refer to specific B/Es. e.g., VEGAS 260/10, 15 thousand… GHOST 090/06, angels 18…
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In RL all S-300 variants are enogh good to detect and kill incoming HARMs amd ARMs. Even OSA had limited ARM capabilites. Tor also has.
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They woudn’t really know it, they would assume it based on experience, familiarity with enemy SEAD tactics, precautions, etc.
FYI, in yougoslvia, the hit rate of HARMS vs SA-6 batteries was abysmal yet no SA-6 managed any kill on coalition aircrafts. That’s exactly what suppression does against skilled operators : they managed to evade destruction with good tactics but were never able to shoot down anybody.
During AF yes, but in 1995 Scott O’Grady was downed by a Kub. During AF the ALE-50 + ALQ-131/184 combo literally eliminated the Kub threat.
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During training on the other hand, setting HQ is a matter of course and part of many unit SOPS. Its one major part of why there exist jobs in the military to coordinate communications… someone has to produce that OPSTASKLINK etc for you
HQ is not encryption, and can be eavesdropped.
You might like to know that the concept of ‘current bullseye’ is one specific to BMS. It is atypical to have a single bullseye that covers an entire theater, as BMS does. Have a listen to some red flag comms, you will hear them refer to specific B/Es. e.g., VEGAS 260/10, 15 thousand… GHOST 090/06, angels 18…
Well aware of that, but my point remains; the current BULLSEYE list is not known to OPFOR and therefore cleartext communication poses very low risk.
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Need to have the right TOD to do that, and normally to get that you need a PP crypto key to ask GPS for it nicely.