ECM-jamming
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Which doesnt work so well if the victim radar is for instance, only listening for photons of a different frequency than that selected to jam.
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I though that the ECM also used techniques such as range gate pull-off etc.
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I though that the ECM also used techniques such as range gate pull-off etc.
Comes under the heading of repeater or deception jamming. RGPO is a specific technique within the category of deception jamming.
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There is a cockpit hud vid out there on YT from a Turkish viper, trying to (illegally) intercept some Israel Sufa’s that were officially exercising above Cyprus, and while heading on to them the pilots report to their GCI that their FCR’s & RWR’s are lighted up with target emissions all over the place, while the GCI sees none.
Yeap, the Sufa has the stronger jammer between all viper fleet.
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Unusual that they would demonstrate that capability where it could be observed. I am given to understand the US has a different set of programs for their jammers for exercises vs the real deal.
As opposed to recent actions by Turkish fast jet pilots as I am, intercepting an aircraft is not illegal unless hostile actions are involved.
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There is a cockpit hud vid out there on YT from a Turkish viper, trying to (illegally) intercept some Israel Sufa’s that were officially exercising above Cyprus, and while heading on to them the pilots report to their GCI that their FCR’s & RWR’s are lighted up with target emissions all over the place, while the GCI sees none.
Yeap, the Sufa has the stronger jammer between all viper fleet.
Pls. post it.
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Are we talking about the 90s then? F-117 is retired…
Noise jammers as a concept have issues. To spread it out over a frequency range decreases effective power for that frequency, or drives up total power consumption. There is a limit to how effective that can be.
Noise jamming EWRs is a bit pointless. It announces your presence, but doesnt conceal it any more than the stealth aircraft do.
Which does not matter. Even the n+1 generation of S-300 and older systems in Russia workwed with dm-m search radar, S-300 with CW Calsm Shell low level search radar and separate fire control radar. If you supress the EW radar the capability of the SAM system is only a fraction of the original and much, much more vulnerable to SEAD.
Regardless S-300 have 105 fire arc with Flap Lid and later PESA (or AESA) radar they does not have seach capability. With information of 360 deg. EW radar is determined the fire arc and also the protection against incoming ARMs outside of 105 deg fire arc. HARM can use side and even backlobe.
Downing the F-117 would not be possible if the jamming would be this strong. The 25-30 km detection range and exact info made possible to make the lock with SNR-125 and guide just in time within the very narrow time window.
This is light jam…
Which became serious…
And total blindness…
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Unusual that they would demonstrate that capability where it could be observed. I am given to understand the US has a different set of programs for their jammers for exercises vs the real deal.
ALL aerial jammer platforms (which 95% of currently available systems ARE US-made) have 2 modes of operation, decided during the system startup: WAR & PEACE (might be named differently in some systems, e.g. trainings vs peace). It is self-explanatory what each mode offers in regards to output power and some other stuff…
As opposed to recent actions by Turkish fast jet pilots as I am, intercepting an aircraft is not illegal unless hostile actions are involved.
Nop.
As per NATO standards, which I guess covers most international actions, (thus don’t care what North Korea for example translate these actions and standards), “interception” can ONLY be performed by specific fighters (not type-specific, but certified down to s/n…) by specific crews (trained), and for specific cases, like a civilian is not answering the comms, diverted without clearance (renegade / air-hostage / simple problems to radio / systems etc) entered an unauthorized area, or not published a flight plan to the appropriate agencies about the flight and intentions.
So “intercepting” an aft which is not hostile, does not move hostile, and has approved flight plans for an official exercise, by officially approved agencies, is not “legal”, specially if not even warned about. Personally, knowing the IAF reactions to “threats”, and talked to some IAF pilots trained here, I think the “interceptors” were very lucky that day, considering and the Israel-Turkish relations those days…
I don’t want to point the discussion to this, but you should be very careful when using the words “unless hostile actions are involved”, because this is what is happening here the past decades, by our friends Turks. So please let’s stick to the ECM-jamming topic.
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Are we talking about the 90s then? F-117 is retired…
Noise jammers as a concept have issues. To spread it out over a frequency range decreases effective power for that frequency, or drives up total power consumption. There is a limit to how effective that can be.
Noise jamming EWRs is a bit pointless. It announces your presence, but doesnt conceal it any more than the stealth aircraft do.
There is no cloak of invisibility. Standoff jamming support is still required for stealth jets and bombers attacking targets defended by modern air defenses. The retirement of the F-117 changed nothing. Noise jamming is not a kill switch but a tool, which can still be effective if used properly. Stealth aircraft do not require continuous jamming support. They only require enough jamming to for nterrupt the decision cycle of air defenses in order to move in and out of a threat location. The jammer is not escorting the strikers, so it can be poisoned in an area where it does not give away the strikers position. On other occasions deception jamming techniques might be used or network attack, miniature air launched decoy, or even the use of a microwave weapon.
For every measure their is a counter measure. Deception jamming can also be countered. AESA radars makes it more difficult to use, but development still continues to produces systems to attack those systems. The ALQ-99 put out a lot of electromagnetic energy. In the near future the Growler will carry the Next Generation Pod which will include four AESA arrays in each pod, producing even more jamming power.
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Stealth aircraft do not require continuous jamming support. They only require enough jamming to for nterrupt the decision cycle of air defenses in order to move in and out of a threat location.
This is also true for non stealth just stealth AC are more harder to detect.
The jammer is not escorting the strikers, so it can be poisoned in an area where it does not give away the strikers position. On other occasions deception jamming techniques might be used or network attack, miniature air launched decoy, or even the use of a microwave weapon.
Maybe or maybe not. During Cold War EF-111 praticed not only station SOJ but flying with stirke F-111s in a same package into deep enemy territory.
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Are we talking about the 90s then? F-117 is retired…
Noise jammers as a concept have issues. To spread it out over a frequency range decreases effective power for that frequency, or drives up total power consumption. There is a limit to how effective that can be.
Noise jamming EWRs is a bit pointless. It announces your presence, but doesnt conceal it any more than the stealth aircraft do.
This is not entirely accurate. There are algorithms designed to calculate exactly how much of a signal on a specific frequency needs to be blocked or changed in order to effectively disrupt the data on the signal, it’s less than you might think–which means as long as you can maintain a specific amount of signal on a specific frequency there is no loss to effectiveness when spreading ECM across a spectrum.
I also have to disagree with announcing your presence–unless there is something in the BMS code which flags when there is any transmission from an aircraft (Which is super unrealistic), I doubt electron emission is implemented in BMS. Even if it were, there are VERY few small aircraft which can carry passive detection systems, and most of the mobile ground units are ineffective at best. Radar transceivers are specifically tuned to look for the return of the signal they send out. If a radar is seeing ECM returns it means it would have seen the non-ECM return just as easily because that’s how RF works. If the RF from the ECM has line of sight and gets to the receiver, then so would the reflected radar RF from the transceiver. I keep seeing this argument about BMS and RF energy giving away your position be it in ECM or discussions about IFF and having to turn it off in enemy territory etc… I am quite positive those mechanics are not implemented in BMS, or at least not remotely close to accurately. Passive, broad-spectrum detection is not as cut and dry as people make it out to seem in these forums. It’s not like going into silent mode on the panel hides you from everything out there–I can assure you if there is a system out there that is detecting your RF emissions, they have already seen you on radar. No missile system or active tracking system in the world (Except HARM types) are going to rely on signals generated FROM the target in order to provide tracking or detection. That’s why RADAR works–YOU generate the signal and it bounces back to your receiver. Now, actively transmitting in the same freq range as a radar system out there searching (IE from your own radar) WILL produce a bigger return to the system searching (In RL anyway) if it is in the same freq range, but RF is RF whether it’s reflected from an aircraft or generated by an aircraft it will travel the same. Someone has to be listening to the right freqs for it to make a difference. So unless IADS has magically been implemented in a way more advanced way than anything else in the game–there should not be any passive detection or increased visibility from ECM. SHOULD being the keyword.
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As per NATO standards, which I guess covers most international actions, (thus don’t care what North Korea for example translate these actions and standards), “interception” can ONLY be performed by specific fighters (not type-specific, but certified down to s/n…) by specific crews (trained), and for specific cases, like a civilian is not answering the comms, diverted without clearance (renegade / air-hostage / simple problems to radio / systems etc) entered an unauthorized area, or not published a flight plan to the appropriate agencies about the flight and intentions.
So “intercepting” an aft which is not hostile, does not move hostile, and has approved flight plans for an official exercise, by officially approved agencies, is not “legal”, specially if not even warned about. Personally, knowing the IAF reactions to “threats”, and talked to some IAF pilots trained here, I think the “interceptors” were very lucky that day, considering and the Israel-Turkish relations those days…
I don’t want to point the discussion to this, but you should be very careful when using the words “unless hostile actions are involved”, because this is what is happening here the past decades, by our friends Turks. So please let’s stick to the ECM-jamming topic.
NATO standards do not constitute international law. If you do not want to point the discussion there, perhaps you should have left it at that, rather than making your post.
I also have to disagree with announcing your presence–unless there is something in the BMS code which flags when there is any transmission from an aircraft (Which is super unrealistic), I doubt electron emission is implemented in BMS. Even if it were, there are VERY few small aircraft which can carry passive detection systems, and most of the mobile ground units are ineffective at best.
This conversation hasnt really been applicable to BMS much at all. ECM in BMS does not bear too much similarity to ECM in RL. There in fact is something in BMS code which flags when there is ECM from an aircraft. You will see jamming chevrons from further away than you can see radar returns, too.
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This conversation hasnt really been applicable to BMS much at all. ECM in BMS does not bear too much similarity to ECM in RL. There in fact is something in BMS code which flags when there is ECM from an aircraft. You will see jamming chevrons from further away than you can see radar returns, too.
That’s the point I was trying to make. People talk in circles about how they only want to implement systems into BMS that are as accurate as possible but completely overlook something like this which is blaringly wrong. Like I said I used to always see that argument when people were discussing trying to implement IFF and one of the MAIN arguments against trying to implement it was the RF control, and inhibiting it in certain areas, and failures, and programming the AI to turn it on/off at a moving FLOT etc… which all revolved around a flat out wrong interpretation of RF emissions and passive detection. The same applies to the ECM system. The implementation is just way off target, and in certain circumstances can do more harm than good.
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In fairness, this is one of those areas that making concrete improvements to requires concrete data…. which by design, is not available to the public. I personally think there are good solutions available to this problem, most of which are open source intel, but that is probably a different topic.
Not all radar receivers are so specificly tuned, and you are no doubt well aware there exist SIGINT craft whose purpose is to look at such emissions. Its possible to nail down an area a fighter radar emission comes from, with decent accuracy, when its in a search mode. Noise jamming is similarly helpful for locating an origin. An unchecked repeater jammer screams that something is there, even if the exact location is hard to nail down.
We can certainly agree that EMCON is something that could see a wide spectrum upgrade (pardon the pun), for radar, IFF, and ECM.
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This is also true for non stealth just stealth AC are more harder to detect.
Maybe or maybe not. During Cold War EF-111 praticed not only station SOJ but flying with stirke F-111s in a same package into deep enemy territory.
Agreed, but I think you use different tactics for non stealth jets, especially if the threat includes modern air defenses. The Iraqi IADs during DS was probably the most sophisticated/dense air defenses the US has faced - the Serbians probably the best trained.
Many of the strike packages that went into Iraq during DS were large. They would at some point split off into smaller packages but the lack of PGMs necessitated more strikers for per target. Jammer would accompany these packages into Iraq while the IADs was still functional in order to mask their ingress and take up orbiting stations near intended targets or the areas with SAMs that were not taken down yet. The threat will dictate the type of jamming required - noise or deception - and whether or not the jammer needs to escort the package to the target.
My statement regarding the jammer not escorting the striker was only in reference to the protection of stealth platforms and the concern that noise jamming would reveal the location of the strike package. That being said as was mentioned there are techniques which are employed to mask the location of noise jamming.
There are many electronic techniques and tactics that the U.S. can employ. Each one is a tool in the tool box. The employment of a particular technique or tactic will depend on the threat and the target.
You are right that there are occasions when non stealth platforms will not require much jamming - but that really depends on the threat.
Attacking targets with non stealth platforms against a sophisticated IADS may not only require jamming support from both manned platforms like the Growler and unmanned ones like the MALD-J, but also decoys, and a heavy dose of SAM suppression.
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In fairness, this is one of those areas that making concrete improvements to requires concrete data…. which by design, is not available to the public. I personally think there are good solutions available to this problem, most of which are open source intel, but that is probably a different topic.
Not all radar receivers are so specificly tuned, and you are no doubt well aware there exist SIGINT craft whose purpose is to look at such emissions. Its possible to nail down an area a fighter radar emission comes from, with decent accuracy, when its in a search mode. Noise jamming is similarly helpful for locating an origin. An unchecked repeater jammer screams that something is there, even if the exact location is hard to nail down.
We can certainly agree that EMCON is something that could see a wide spectrum upgrade (pardon the pun), for radar, IFF, and ECM.
No I’m not arguing the existence of those aircraft. Hence why I said very few and limited it to small aircraft. Most of those platforms are rather large and explicitly designed for only that function. But I haven’t seen any of them in BMS. I think it would be great to put those in the game, along with Precision and Stand-Off Jammers that actually work and effect IVC as well as other RF. But I also think it would be nice to win the Lottery–
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This is not entirely accurate. There are algorithms designed to calculate exactly how much of a signal on a specific frequency needs to be blocked or changed in order to effectively disrupt the data on the signal, it’s less than you might think–which means as long as you can maintain a specific amount of signal on a specific frequency there is no loss to effectiveness when spreading ECM across a spectrum.
I also have to disagree with announcing your presence–unless there is something in the BMS code which flags when there is any transmission from an aircraft (Which is super unrealistic), I doubt electron emission is implemented in BMS. Even if it were, there are VERY few small aircraft which can carry passive detection systems, and most of the mobile ground units are ineffective at best. Radar transceivers are specifically tuned to look for the return of the signal they send out. If a radar is seeing ECM returns it means it would have seen the non-ECM return just as easily because that’s how RF works. If the RF from the ECM has line of sight and gets to the receiver, then so would the reflected radar RF from the transceiver. I keep seeing this argument about BMS and RF energy giving away your position be it in ECM or discussions about IFF and having to turn it off in enemy territory etc… I am quite positive those mechanics are not implemented in BMS, or at least not remotely close to accurately. Passive, broad-spectrum detection is not as cut and dry as people make it out to seem in these forums. It’s not like going into silent mode on the panel hides you from everything out there–I can assure you if there is a system out there that is detecting your RF emissions, they have already seen you on radar. No missile system or active tracking system in the world (Except HARM types) are going to rely on signals generated FROM the target in order to provide tracking or detection. That’s why RADAR works–YOU generate the signal and it bounces back to your receiver. Now, actively transmitting in the same freq range as a radar system out there searching (IE from your own radar) WILL produce a bigger return to the system searching (In RL anyway) if it is in the same freq range, but RF is RF whether it’s reflected from an aircraft or generated by an aircraft it will travel the same. Someone has to be listening to the right freqs for it to make a difference. So unless IADS has magically been implemented in a way more advanced way than anything else in the game–there should not be any passive detection or increased visibility from ECM. SHOULD being the keyword.
This isn’t true. Take for example an adversary with a low RCS but dirty emissions. You could get a spike on your RWR before your radar picks him up (especially if you have a crappy radar).
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No missile system or active tracking system in the world (Except HARM types) are going to rely on signals generated FROM the target in order to provide tracking or detection
Yea about that…HOJ is kind of already a thing. Multiple SAM systems and AA platforms have done it for years.
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I haven’t seen any of them in BMS.
The RC-135 Rivet Joint (which is indeed the SIGINT variant) is there but I don’t know if it actually does anything throughout the campaign.
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Yea about that…HOJ is kind of already a thing. Multiple SAM systems and AA platforms have done it for years.
HOJ is an auxiliary method of homing, not a primary method. My point was to say that the systems don’t explicitly rely on a target system to generate the required energy for homing, like a HARM does when not fired at a pre-designated point. HOJ is an energy DF type system which augments the targeting algorithm by searching for the strongest source of the specific RF being emitted, but it is not a sole source of tracking for systems.
This isn’t true. Take for example an adversary with a low RCS but dirty emissions. You could get a spike on your RWR before your radar picks him up (especially if you have a crappy radar). And no missile systems that track radar emissions? Oh really? List of Active Radar Homing Missiles.
Active homing is not the same as HOJ, it means it has it’s own radar system which can take over guidance and not rely solely on the employing aircraft for start to finish guidance. This is the PITBULL call you hear when you fire a 120 in the sim. But I definitely believe everything I read on Wikipedia too, it’s always more accurate than 20+ years in the USAF, although if you would’ve actually read that entire article you might have thought twice about posting it. But since you like Wikipedia so much here’s a link to explain the RWR–read the first sentence which clearly says it reads the RADAR emissions of an aircraft. We are talking about ECM and other emissions, I clearly stated your Radar can cause a return for other aircraft to see on their Radars if they are in the same range, this is the same as an RWR which is preprogrammed to look for certain emissions which fit the mold of a radar carried on specific aircraft. So technically you’re correct an RWR may spike before a RADAR return from a low RCS aircraft, if there is a low RCS combat aircraft out there somewhere spewing forward a ton RF into a combat zone.
But you have both missed the point of my comments. In the BMS world, this RF emissions argument is entirely over used. RF emissions are considered a yes/no thing in BMS, which is incorrect. That is what the entire comment was about, the physics behind it and the pick and choose implementation of “accurate” systems based on not-at-all modeled particle physics. That’s not a bash on the BMS team, they have done a lot to improve the game. I’m just trying to say that I keep seeing this argument everywhere that any emissions in an environment automatically give away your position, and that EMCON is a big, accurately modeled function of BMS–but it’s not. It’s just a bit somewhere that says emitting or not, which is a huge oversimplification.